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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Full Faith and Credit Does Not Forbid Piecemeal
Application of Foreign Workmen's Compensation Statute.-Petitioner, a
resident of Alabama and there employed by a Georgia corporation, was
injured in Alabama. He sued, in an Alabama court, under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act. The state court entered a default judgment, although
the Georgia Act purported to grant an exclusive remedy which could be
afforded only by the Georgia Compensation Board.' Petitioner then sought
the aid of the federal court to enforce his judgment. The action was dismissed
in the district court,2 and the court of appeals affirmedO on the ground that the
Alabama court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, finding that the dismissal had been based on the full faith and
credit clause of the federal constitution, and that this clause did not require
recognition of the administrative procedure. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 85 Sup.
Ct. 769 (1965).

Under the early rule of Bradford Elec. Light Co. v.Clapper,4 the state of
injury was required by the full faith and credit clauses to defer to the workmen's compensation act of the state of the employment contract when the
latter state's act was exclusive in nature.0 The Clapper Court noted, first, that
the forum state's interest was only casual 7 and, second, that it was not shoVM to
be against the public policy of the forum state to give full faith and credit to
the exclusive foreign statute.8 Subsequent cases limited and distinguished the

Clapper decision. Thus, Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace.
c . o 'nq
held that California could apply its own act though the plaintiff was injured
in Alaska and the contract, made in California, contemplated that the Maska
act, which was exclusive, should apply. The Court noted that if California did
not grant relief there was the distinct possibility that the plaintiff would become a charge of that state.' 0 This interest, coupled with the fact that the Court
felt it was against California's public policy to deny recovery, was considered
sufficient to allow California to apply its own law and still not contravene
the Full Faith and Credit Clause." Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.Industrial
1. "The rights and remedies herein granted ... shall
edies . . . ." Ga. Code Ann. 114-103 (1956).

exclude all other rights and rem-

2. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. S7 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
3. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 324 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
4. 2S6 U.S. 145 (1932).

5.
State
6.
7.
S.
9.
10.
11.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 states that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
to the public Acts ...of every other State."
2S6 U.S. at 155-59.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 159-62.
294 U.S. 532 (1935).
Id. at 542, 549.
Id. at 550.
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Acc. Comnm'n' 2 applied the same reasoning 13 in a case where the plaintiff, a
Massachusetts resident, was injured in California while working for a Massachusetts corporation. Carroll v. Lanza 14 completed the cycle. On reasoning,
impossible to reconcile with Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper,'6 the Court
allowed Arkansas, where the plaintiff was injured, to apply its own common law
remedy instead of the exclusive workmen's compensation statute of Missouri,
the state in which plaintiff had entered into the employ of his employer. Carroll
v. Lanza did not involve an indigent worker who might have become a charge
of the state of Arkansas and Arkansas' only interest was found in the fact
that it was the place of injury.' 6 Thus, the casual interest of Clapper became
a sufficient "governmental interest" to the Lanza Court.
The instant court, reasoning that Alabama, the state of both injury and
domicile, had an interest "at least commensurate" to that present in any of
the earlier cases, ruled that the Alabama court did not violate the full faith
and credit clause in granting the judgment in question.17 In so doing the
majority failed to discuss the fact that the plaintiff was suing under a statute
which provided that it could only be invoked before the Georgia Workmen's
Compensation Board. This represents a factual distinction from the earlier
cases which applied the law of the forum in preference to an exclusive statute
of the foreign state. It was this distinction which caused Mr. Justice Goldberg
to conclude in his dissent:' 8 "The federal issue raised by respondent is
12. 306 U.S. 493 (1938).
13. Id. at 502-03. The Court distinguished Clapper on the basis that in Pacific It would
clearly be against California's policy not to grant relief; while in Clapper there was no
such evidence. Id. at 504.
14. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
15. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
16. Id. at 413.
17. 85 Sup. Ct. at 770-71.
18. Mr. Justice Goldberg disagreed with the majority decision to remand the case
to the circuit court on two grounds. First, he disagreed with the majority that the lower
court decisions were based on a misconception of the full faith and credit clause but
rather "believe[d] that the lower courts did rest their decisions upon independent state
law .. . ." 85 Sup. Ct. at 773. This view seems correct since Green v. J. A. Jones Constr.
Co., 161 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 147) (per curiam), cited as controlling by the lower court
does not mention full faith and credit. The authorities cited by the Green court are all
cases decided on the basis of state law. Id. n.2.
Second, Mr. Justice Goldberg noted that even if his analysis of the lower court decisions
was incorrect, this "would not justify the Court's ignoring the fact that the decision below
is clearly supported by independent state law and, as a consequence, the constitutional
issue should not be reached and decided." 85 Sup. Ct. at 774. See Neese v. Southern Ry.,
350 U.S. 77, 78 (1955). It seems clear that Alabama law would prohibit an Alabama court
from entertaining an action under the Georgia statute, 85 Sup. Ct. at 774 (dissenting opinion).
In Singleton v. Hope Eng'r Co., 233 Ala. 538, 137 So. 441 (1931), the Alabama Supreme
Court held that "the right sought to be enforced had its origin and existence in the
Georgia Workmen's compensation statute. The remedies for its breach are recoverable
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whether, consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a State may enforce
in its courts the liability claims created by another State in violation of that
other State's fised policy to have those claims enforced only by an administrative board. There is no decision of this Court which settles this federal
issue and, in my view, the question is not free from difficulty."' 1
While this question has not received a direct answer, the answer is necessarily
implicit in the Alaska Packers, Pacific Employers and CarroM v. Lanz-a
trio of cases. In each of those cases the question of full faith and credit was
entwined with due process considerations. In Alaska Packcrs the same interest,
i.e., the state's concern for the indigent worker, was advanced to satisfy both
the due process and full faith and credit objections. - ° Pacific Employcrs
cited with approval Alaska Packers as holding that "The full faith and credit
exacted for the statute of one state does not necessarily preclude another state
from enforcing in its own courts its own conflicting statute having no extraterritorial operation forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment .... -I The
interrelationship of the two concepts was perhaps more clearly underscored
in Carroll v. Lanza where the Court, to support its conclusion that the mere
fact of injury in the state was sufficient governmental interest to satisfy
the full faith and credit clause,22 cited a due process decision, Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.23 The inference seems clear "that, when it is
acknowledged that each state has a legitimate, or substantial, interest-an
interest sufficient to justify the application of its law so far as the Due Process
Clause is concerned-then . . . each state is free to apply its own law,

consistently with the Full Faith and Credit Clause."24
If a state can acquire a sufficient interest to apply, consistently with due
process, its own internal law in preference to the common law of another
state, should it not then be permitted, given the same interest, to borrow
piecemeal, consistently with full faith and credit, the statute of another state?
From this point of view, is it not clear that Alabama, the place of injury
and the domicile of plaintiff, had a sufficient interest to apply its own workmen's compensation statute or the statute of any other jurisdiction which
in the manner provided by proper pleadings and procedure before the Industrial Commission of our sister state." Id. at 540, 137 So. at 443.
19. 85 Sup. Ct. at 772 (dissenting opinion).
20. 294 U.S. at 542, 549.
21. 306 U.S. at 503.
22. 349 U.S. at 413.

23. 343 U.S. 66 (1954). This casce involved a Louisiana direct action statute which
permitted Louisiana residents to bring direct actions against insurance companies insuring
the tortfeasor even when the state in which the contract was made forbade such actions.
The Court recognized the dose relationship of due process and full faith and credit when,
after having shown that the Louisiana statute was consistent with due process, it stated:

"What we have said . . . [about due process] goes far toward answering the Full Faith
and Credit Clause contention." Id. at 73.
24. Currie, The Constitution and The Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and The
judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 22 (1953).
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had a reasonable relationship to plaintiff's employment? In other words,
neither the due process clause nor the full faith and credit clause should
be permitted to require rigid choice of law rules nor to turn every choice of
law decision into one of constitutional law. This may foster a lack of uniformity in conflict of laws rules but, as Judge Kaufman, in Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 25 sensibly noted: "The field of conflict of laws, the
most underdeveloped in our jurisprudence from a practical standpoint, is
just now breaking loose from the ritualistic thinking of the last century ...
The development will be stillborn if we impose inflexible constitutional stric"1"
tures in the name of national unity ....

Coram Nobis-Indigent Defendant Entitled to Assigned Counsel at Coram
Nobis Hearing.-Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, and
did not appeal. Several months thereafter he mailed a petition for writ of error
coram nobis' to the trial court and requested appointment of counsel to represent him. The trial court granted a hearing on the writ, but refused to appoint
counsel.2 On appeal from a denial of the defendant's petition, the district
court of appeals reversed and remanded with instruction to assign counsel
to represent defendant at the coram nobis hearing. The state supreme court
granted the attorney general's petition for a hearing to determine recurring
coram nobis questions. The court, in reversing and remanding8 to the trial
court, held that whenever facts are sufficient to warrant a hearing, the indigent
party is entitled to appointed counsel. People v. Shipman, - Cal. 2d -, 397
P.2d 993 (1965).
The problem of adequate legal representation for indigent coram nobis
petitioners arises at four stages: first, in drafting the petition; second, on
appeal from denial of coram nobis without a hearing; third, on the coram
nobis hearing itself; and fourth, on appeal from a hearing denying coram
nobis. Although the court here held that an indigent petitioner is entitled,
as of right, to assigned counsel at the hearing and on appeal from a hearing,
it nevertheless dismissed any absolute right to assigned counsel in drafting
the petition and on appeal from the denial of the petition without a hearing."
25.
26.

309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
309 F.2d at 563.

1. Coram Nobis in California is equivalent to a motion to vacate judgment and Is
based on an error of fact unknown to the trial court. People v. Tuthill, 32 Cal. 2d 819, 82021, 198 P.2d 505, 506-07 (1948). In most jurisdictions throughout the United States coram
nobis is employed in the same fashion as it is in California. See Frank, Coram Nobis 1 1.01
(1953).

2. A public defender appeared on several occasions to assist in filing papers and obtaining
continuances. People v. Shipman, - Cal. 2d -,
3. The court affirmed the district court of

4. Id. at-,

397 P.2d at 997.

-,

397 P.2d 993, 995 (1965).

appeal and reversed the trial court. Ibid.
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In denying an indigent the right to counsel in the first two stages, the court
stated that a contrary holding would require the appointment of counsel

to "every prisoner who asserts that there may be some possible ground for
challenging his conviction." ' 5 The court took a practical approach to the
problem of appointing counsel, recognizing that certain basic requirements

must be met before a hearing will be granted and counsel appointed.0 Several

states have attempted to assist the indigent petitioner in drafting for coram
nobis by enacting post-conviction procedure statutes.7 One such statute"
makes it "the duty of the public defender to represent . . ." any indigent
person imprisoned within the state who may assert the unlawfulness or

illegality of his confinement. Generally, counsel will be appointed upon request,
any necessary transcripts will be furnished free of charge, and an appeal

may be taken from a final judgment on the hearing of the petition.0 As a
result of these post-conviction statutes, an indigent has the opportunity to be
5. Ibid.
6. Id. at -, 397 P.2d at 995. For a discussion of the grounds for coram nobi relief in
New York, see Kirkpatrick, Law Notes for Judges and Lawyers §§ 1, 3 (1963); Comment,
32 Fordham L. Rev. S03-13 (1964). See generally Frank, op. cit. supra note 1, E3.01-.02 (e);
Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 631, 695 (1961).
A hearing was -ranted in People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y.2d 2C0, 144 N.E.2d 10, 165 N.Y.S2d
11 (1957) (trial forced upon defendant without adequate opportunity to prepare a defenecoram nobis lies). In People v. Lain, 309 N.Y. 291, 293, 130 N.E.2d 105, 106 (1955) the
court stated: "in coram nobis a petitioner swearing to allegations such as tho:e in this
petition is entitled to a trial [hearing] thereof in open court unless his claims are 'conclusively refuted by unquestionable documentary proof.'" (Emphasis omitted.) See People
v. Guariglia, 303 N.Y. 338, 343, 102 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1951) ; People v. Hughec, 3 App. Div.
2d 302. 1S7 N.Y.S.2d 32S (1st Dep't 1959) (per curiam) (upon defendant's unopposed
papers, a hearing was granted). But see People v. Picart, 14 N.Y.2d 789, 199 N.E2d 46,
250 N.Y.S.2d S15 (1964) (memorandum decision) (hearing denied).
7. Il1.Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 122-1-122-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 13-140113-1406 (1956); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15-217-15-222 (Supp. 1963); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 13S.50138.6S0 (1963); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 958.01-953.14 (195S).
8. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1402 (1956). The Indiana public defender's office initially
investigates an indigent's assertion of unlawful or illegal confinement and thereafter
drafts a petition for filing with the court. For a discussion of coram nobis and the postconviction statute in Indiana, see Note, 26 Ind. L.J. 529 (1951).
9. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 33, §§ 122-4, 122-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ind. Ann. Star. §§ 13-1402,
13-1405 (1956); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15-219, 15-222 (Supp. 1963); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.590
(1963); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 953.07 (1953). In federal habeas corpus, the indigent is furnished
necessary transcripts. 23 U.S.C. § 2250; see also 28 U.S.C. § 225 (federal coram nobis).
Appointment of counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings is not required in every case.
United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 231 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960) (frivolow
applications do not require assignment of counsel). The court may appoint counsel if
satisfied the action is not frivolous or malicious. 23 U.S.C. § 1915(d). See Ellis v. United
States, 356 U.S. 674 (1953) (per curiam) (counsel may withdraw if appeal is frivolous).
There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings.
United States ex rel. Marshall v. Iilkins, 333 F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1964); Dorsey v.
Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945).
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assisted by counsel throughout the proceedings. Although the New York
Legislature has been considering a statutory remedy in lieu of coram nobis,
it has not yet provided for such a procedure. 10 Further, New York, as well
as California, has not required assignment of counsel to aid indigent in
drafting his petition, even though it is a critical juncture, since it generally
determines the fate of the petition.
The instant court was of the opinion that if the petition failed to state
a prima facie case, "counsel need not be appointed . . . on appeal from a
summary denial of relief in . . . [the trial] court."'" Until recently, the New

York courts took the same position. 12 However, in People v. Hughes,13 the
New York Court of Appeals held that "an indigent defendant, who is by
statute accorded an absolute right to appeal to the Appellate Division (or to
some other appellate court), is entitled to assignment of counsel to represent
him on such appeal if he so requests. This rule applies whether the appeal
be from a judgment of conviction or an order denying an application for
coram nobis . . . relief."' 4 In addition to requiring assignment of counsel on
appeal from a denial of a hearing, Hughes also requires assignment on appeal
from the hearing. This decision clarifies prior law and definitely establishes
a new and more inclusive rule on the right to assigned counsel in New York.',
The New York Court of Appeals, unlike the high court of California, has
never ruled on the question of whether counsel must be assigned at the hearing of the coram nobis petition. Perhaps such a consideration is no longer
necessary. In Gideon v. Wainwright,"0 the Supreme Court held that an indigent
10. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(L) (1959); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65, p. 19 (1960); N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 65, p. 18 (1961).
11. - Cal. 2d at -, 397 P.2d at 997. In New York "the denial of a [coram nobisl hearing was based upon the failure of the petition to raise any triable issue of fact requiring a
hearing and the failure of the Court to assign counsel was based upon the denial of the
hearing." People v. Brandau, 19 Misc. 2d 879, 880, 191 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (Oneida County Ct.
1959).
12. Tbid; People v. St. John, 281 App. Div. 1061, 1062, 121 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (3d Dep't
1953) (per curiam) (assigned counsel-triable issue of fact existed) ; People v. Jester, 4 App.
Div. 2d 841, 842, 168 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (3d Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision).
13. 15 N.Y.2d 172 (1965) (per curiam), overruling People v. Breslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73,
149 N.E.2d 85, 172 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1958) and People v. Di Maggio, 4 N.Y.2d 801, 149
N.E.2d 531, 173 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1958) by implication.
14. 15 N.Y.2d at 173. Section 517(3) of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure
states: "An appeal may be taken as of right by the defendant from an order denying a
motion to vacate a judgment of conviction, otherwise known as a motion or application
for a writ of error coram nobis, to the court to which an appeal from the judgment of conviction would lie . . . ." But cf. United States ex rel. Boone v. Fay, 231 F. Supp. 387, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (holding petitioner not entitled by Constitution to assigned counsel on
appeal from denial of coram nobis petition).
15. Even before Hughes, it was the practice of some departments of the appellate division
to assign counsel on appeal from a denial of coram nobis without a hearing.
16. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The Court,
concerned with the right to assigned counsel at the trial level in a state prosecution for a
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defendant was entitled to the assistance of counsel at trial. During the same
term, in Douglas v. California,'7 the Court also decided that an indigent was

entitled to assigned counsel on his first appeal, as of right. In comparing these
two decisions with the court of appeals opinion in Pcople v. Hughes, it would

appear that an indigent petitioner is entitled to assistance of counsel at the
coram nobis hearing. In most cases the hearing on the coram nobis application

could be equated with the trial stage"s of the criminal proceedings, and an
appeal from a denial of an application for coram nobis after a hearing could

be equated with a first appeal, as of right, from the trial. Since assigned counsel
is required at the trial, on direct appeal, and now as a result of Hughes, on

appeal from a denial of an application for coram nobis, should it not follow that
an indigent is entitled to assigned counsel at the coram nobis hearing?

There have been some lower court decisions in New York holding that
counsel should be assigned at the hearing. In People v. St. John,0 the appellate

division, third department, held that "since the proceeding in coram nobis is
part of the original criminal action the court should have assigned counsel at
appellant's request where a triable issue of fact existed." 20 The same court, in
People v. Jester,-" directed the trial court to assign counsel if requested. It may
be that the New York Court of Appeals has not yet decided the issue because
it has been the practice of the supreme court in several New York counties
outside the third department to assign counsel upon request of an indigent.non-capital offense, held that an indigent has a constitutional right to be represented by
counsel, if requested. Nowhere is there a greater need for counsel than at the trial. Id. at
339-40. See People v. Witenski, No. 66, N.Y. CL of App., April 22, 1965, which reversed a
conviction for failure of a justice of the peace to inform defendants of their right to assigned
counsel.
17. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The Court settled the question of assignment on appeal when
it held that on the first appeal as of right from the trial, indigent petitioners were entitled
to assigned counsel. The Court stated that appellate review cannot be denied on the ba.h
of a defendant's poverty. Where a person with money can procure a full revie w, so should
a poor person be able to get a similar review. Id. at 356-57. But see, People v. Breslin,
4 N.Y.2d 73, 149 N.E.2d 85, 172 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1958) (denying counsel on appeal from trial).
18. Everyone is entitled to their day in court and Gideon guarantees asgned couns
to the indigent at trial. At the coram nobis hearing, facts outside the record which the
defendant had no opportunity to raise at the trial or by appeal and, therefore, never
adjudicated, are reviewed in deciding whether the trial judgment should be vacated. Certain
things appearing in the record are within the scope of coram nobis, such as, failure to
appraise a defendant of his right to counsel at arraignment, denying counsel of defendant's
choice and assertion of invalidity of prior convictions by a second or fourth felony offender.
Kirkpatrick, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1, at 4. Fairness demands that the indigent be accorded
the opportunity to have these facts presented adequately.
19. 2S1 App. Div. 1061, 121 N.Y.S.2d 441 (3d Dep't 1957) (per curiam).
20. Id. at 1061, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 442. (Emphasis omitted.)
21. 4 App. Div. 2d 841, 168 N.Y.S.2d 520 (3d Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision).
22. There apears to be little case law on the right to assigned counsel at the hearing
stage in the other three departments, apparently because several counties appoint counsel
whenever a hearing is granted. Bronx, Erie, Kings, New York and Queens counties appoint
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Undoubtedly, the approach of many state courts with respect to assignment
of counsel in coram nobis proceedings has been influenced by the increasing
liberality of the Supreme Court decisions requiring equal protection for impoverished defendants. In its recent decisions, the Court has emphasized the
necessity of affording indigent parties the same kind of review that is afforded
those who have the means to retain counsel and to purchase transcripts.
It has been difficult to implement the equal protection clause at the many
levels where assistance is necessary. In Griffin v. Illinois,2 3 the Court held that
due process and equal protection must be guaranteed at all stages and that poor
persons must be protected from "invidious discrimination." The Court specifically required that defendants be permitted an appeal
even though they could
24
not afford to pay for a transcript of the trial record.
In Lane v. Brown,25 petitioner was unable to obtain a free transcript due to
the discretionary refusal 20 of the public defender to pursue his coram nobis
appeal, mainly because he thought an appeal would be unsuccessful. 27 The
Supreme Court took issue with the arbitrariness permitted by the state procedure which in effect handicapped the destitute person and denied him the
protection afforded one with money.2 8 It follows that equal protection should
also be accorded indigents in all coram nobis proceedings. The instant court
felt precluded by Douglas from "holding that appointment of counsel in
corain nobis proceedings rests solely in the discretion of the court."20 It also
felt that absolute equality was not required. However, the denial of assistance
at the drafting stage might be an act of "invidious discrimination" if an indigent with a bona fide case is unable to secure a hearing because he is ignorant
of the legal prerequisites.
Perhaps a solution to the problem is the adoption of a post-conviction proceeding statute requiring that the incarcerated prisoner be assisted in drafting
his coram nobis petition. Although it is highly impractical to assign individual
counsel as a matter of policy in all coram nobis hearings. Telephone Interviews With
Several Clerks of New York Supreme Court, Criminal Part, in Bronx, Erie, Kings, New York
and Queens Counties, March, 1965. In Richmond county, Rules 6 and 9 of the Rules
of the Supreme Court authorize the court to appoint counsel to indigent coram nobis
petitioners.
23. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
24. The Illinois Supreme Court had interpreted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to deny
petitioners a free transcript. Id. at 19. See Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison
Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); McCrary v. Indiana, 364 U.S. 277 (1960) (per
curiam). See also People v. Pride, 3 N.Y.2d 545, 147 N.E.2d 719, 170 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1958).
25.

372 U.S. 477 (1963).

26. Id. at 480-82.
27. Id. at 482, n.10.

28. Id. at 481. Both the district court and the court of appeals in Lane found that
the procedure substantially denied "indigent defendants the benefits of an existing system
of appellate review." Id. at 483. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (request
for transcript).
29. -

Cal. 2d at -,

397 P.2d at 996.
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counsel to every prospective coram nobis applicant, a procedure similar to
that in Indiana,30 whereby a public defender assists in the drafting and presentation of a petition is a practical solution. 31

Criminal Law-Felony Murder-Killing of Co-Felon by an Intended Victim Held to be a Ground for Felony Murder.-In an attempted robbery of
a service station, the station's proprietor shot and killed defendant's co-felon.
Despite defendant's denials that he was not involved in the robbery, the trial
court found him guilty of that crime and also of felony murder. The present
case was an appeal from a denial of a new trial. The District Court of Appeal,
one judge dissenting, held that the defendant could properly be convicted of
murder even though he neither actively nor constructively instituted the deathdealing act. People v. Washington, 40 Cal. Rptr. 791 (2d Dist. 1964).
The law is well settled that under certain circumstances, a felon may be
convicted of murder for a homicide which occurred during the commission of
a felony.' It is generally conceded that when the homicidal act- is instituted
by a felon while the felony is continuing, the charge of felony murder will lie.n
30. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1402 (1956).
31. Assignment of counsel in coram nobis proceedings may very well save the state
time and money by insuring a proper presentation of the indigent's case and thus preventing
repetitious appeals. See Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 154, 157 (1965) (a discussion of state postconxiction remedies).
1. "Various theories have been propounded to explain the legal rationale for the felonymurder doctrine. The most widely accepted view is that at common law nearly every felony
was punishable by death, and, therefore, it made no difference whether a felon was executed
for one felony or another. One English case [Regina v. Horsey, 3 Fost. & Fin. 237, 176 Eng,
Rep. 129 (1862)] suggests a more rational basis for the doctrine. The annotator of the case
points out that a man can resist the perpetration of a felony by force even to the extent of
killing the felon, and, therefore, if a person is engaged in the commison of a felony for
which he can be lawfully killed, the presumption is that the felon would hill if necez :ary
and such implied intent is sufficient to make it murder. Note, A Survey of Felony Murder,
28 Temp. L.Q. 453, 454 (1955). (Footnotes omitted.)
2. The homicidal act of the felon can be his either directly or constructively. A lethal
act is constructively attributable to a felon, when it is committed by one of his co-felons
during the commission of the crime. There are numerous cases in which a defendant has
been found guilty of murder when the killing was not done by him but rather by one of
his accomplices. E.g., United States ex rel. De Mloss v. Pennsylvania, 19S F. Supp. 570 (EDl.
Pa. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d S41 (3d Cir. 1962); State v. Turner, 193 ran. 19, 392 P.2d E63
(1964); Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102, 176 A.2d 421 (1962). It is said that the
homicidal act is constructively his on the theory that co-felons are agents of each other.
Crum, Causal Relations and The Felony-Mlurder Rule, 1952 Wash. U.L.Q. 191, 193.
3. Within United States jurisdictions, there is some disagreement as to the typzs of
felonies that can act as a basis for a felony-murder conviction. California, for cxample,
limits these felonies to sin crimes which usually involve a substantial risk of violence, Cal.
Pen. Code § 1S9 ("Arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under
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There are, however, two divergent views as to whether it will lie when the
death inflicting act is not instituted by one of the defendants, but rather by
some third party.
The majority view, which requires that the killing be done by one of the
felons, 4 appears to be rooted in the old common law doctrineu that the defendant's malicious intent or mens real in committing the original felony can be
transferred to his or his accomplice's subsequent homicidal act.1 However, there
is now a minority view8 which will not only transfer the required malicious intent, but will also impute to a defendant the lethal acts of someone other than
himself or his confederates. 9 The underlying theory is that when a person
Section 288 . . ."). On the other hand, New York presently would appear to allow "all felonies
which are independent of the homicide, whether or not they are of the type that usually
breed violence," to form the ground work of a felony-murder charge, Byrn, Homicide Under
the Proposed New York Penal Law, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 173, 193 (1964). (Emphasis omitted.)
Note, however, that the New York Proposed Penal Law § 125.25(3) limits the felony-murder
doctrine to homicide arising out of the commission or attempted commission of the crimes
of "robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first
degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second
degree . ..

"

4. For cases representing the view that a person cannot be responsible for the killing
of another unless the lethal act was either actively or constructively his see Butler v. People,
125 Il. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905) ;
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 (1863); People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d
736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924).
S. See note 1 supra.
6. One author notes that "the mens rea or 'malice' necessary for the felony is in every
instance different from the mens rea or 'malice aforethought' required for murder; but for
certain killings the law will allow the latter to be conclusively proved from the former.
This is not to identify them at all-it is merely to say that in certain cases proof of the
particular state of mind required for murder will be established by the mens rea of certain
felonies; it will be malice 'implied' rather than 'express.'" Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 50, 60 (1956). (Emphasis omitted.)
7. There are several cases, commonly known as the "shield" cases, in which a person who
was being used by a felon as a breastwork was accidently killed by the gunfire of pursuers.
See Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934); Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim.
621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900). One
author suggests that the convictions in these cases are exceptions to the majority rule in
that the lethal acts were not committed by one of the felons. Note, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1176,
1177 (1958). Closer analysis of the facts, however, appears to indicate that the cases are
squarely within the majority reasoning, in that the very fact of "placing the victim in this
situation is itself a directly lethal act." Morris, supra note 6, at 54.
8. See People v. Washington, 40 Cal. Rptr. 791 (2d Dist. 1964); People v. Harrison, 1
Cal. Rptr. 414 (2d Dist. 1959); Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955); People v.
Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (1952); Commonwealth v.
Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950); Commonwealth
v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
9. Referring to Justice Bell's statement in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 646,
117 A.2d 204, 207 (1955) (concurring opinion), in which he said that a "person is from
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engages in a felonious act, he "should be held responsible for any death which by

direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act."' 0

Essentially, the proponents of this view, the instant court included, believe that
the proximate cause doctrine'" is as readily applicable to criminal cases as it is
to tort cases.
Original formulation of the minority view is generally attributed to the courts
of Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Moyer,'2 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declared that the defendant felons could be properly found guilty of
murder in the death of a gas station attendant they were attempting to rob,
even though the lethal gun shot was fired by the station's proprietor. Further
support for this new extension of the felony-murder doctrine was given by the

court in Commoiwealth v. Almeida, 13 where it was stated that "whether the

fatal bullet was fired by one of the bandits or by one of the policemen who were
performing their duty . . . is immaterial" 11 as to whether the defendant is
guilty of murder. Finally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Commonwealth v. Thomas,16 a case which was a cornerstone of the minority view until
it was expressly overruled by Commonwealth v. Redltne'0 in 195S. This apparent

reversal of the minority trend by the Redline case met with general approval.' 7

The minority view again appeared, however, when in the following year the

second District Court of Appeal of California in People v. Harrison' denied
a new trial to a felon who had been convicted of murder in the death of a store
owner even though the fatal shot was fired during a holdup by the owner's clerk.
time immemorial responsible for the natural and reasonably foreeeable results of the
felony," Professor Morris unequivocally asserts that the "proposition . . .is false if it is
meant to imply, as it would seem to, that a felon has from time immemorial, because of
the 'malice' of his felony, been responsible for more than his owm acts or those of his cofelon in pursuance of the felony. Not until Almeida, [supra note 8] is responsibility more
widely cast than this." Morris, supra note 6, at 61. (Footnote omitted.)
10. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 190-91, 53 A.2d 736, 741 (1947). (Emphasis
added.)
11. Although the cases do not explicitly mention tort proximate cause, this, in effect, is the
standard they are applying. See notes 27-32 infra for a discussion of pro.ximate came as
used by the minority view.
12. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
13. 362 Pa. 596, 6S A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950).
14. Id. at 610, 63 A.2d at 602-03.
15. 332 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955). While attempting to make good an ezcapa after
having robbed a storekeeper, the defendant's co-felon vs mortally wounded by the robbery
victim. The defendant was subsequently convicted for the death of his partner.
16. 391 Pa. 436, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). This case, like the Thomas decision, involved the
death of a felon. However, here the lethal shot was fired by a pursuing policeman rather
than the ictim.
17. See 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1565 (1953); 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1197 (1953); 106 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1176 (1958); 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. SOS (1953). But see 32 Temp. L.Q. 117 (1953).
is. 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (2d Dist. 1959). This case and the Thomas case, which wan overruled
by the Redline case, were the only cases cited by the instant court in support of its holding.
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It should be noted that prior to the Redline' decision, the courts of Florida "0
and Michigan 21 followed Pennsylvania's lead by adopting the view that felons
could be guilty of murder for lethal acts, which were neither actively nor constructively committed by them. Michigan, however, has since reappraised its
position, and although not expressly overruling its previous stand, has seriously
22
limited the application of the minority view. The court in People v. Austin,
while refusing to hold a felon guilty of murder in the killing of one of his
accomplices by the victim of the robbery, let stand a prior conviction2 3 where
there was the killing of an innocent person by a non-participant in the felony.
Similarly, the majority in the Redline case, although overruling2 4 Commonwealth v. Thomas (the killing of a co-felon), refused to disturb 26 the holding in
Commonwealth v. Almeida where the defendant was held guilty of murder in
the death of an innocent third party. Both the Redline and Austin cases defended
this rather doubtful distinction on the grounds that the killing of a felon was
justifiable, whereas it was only excusable in the case of an innocent third party.-",
The dissent in the present case, would also make a distinction between the
killing of an accomplice and of an innocent party, but on grounds somewhat
different from those put forth by either the Redline or Austin courts. In
19. The California felony murder doctrine is found in Section 189 of the Penal Code.
"All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any
other kind of wilfull, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act
punishable under Section 288, is murder of the first degree . . . ." Note that the statute
does not explicitly state that the killing must be done by a felon as does, for example, the
New York statute. "The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, Is
murder in the first degree, when committed ... without a design to affect death, by a person
engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affecting
the person killed or otherwise .... ." N.Y. Pen. Law § 1044(2).
20. Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955).
21. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (1952).
22. 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963).
23. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (1952).
24. 391 Pa. at 508, 137 A.2d at 482.
25. Id. at 510, 137 A.2d at 482-83.
26. Referring to the killing of one of the defendants' accomplices by a policeman, the
court in the Redline case stated that "the homicide was justifiable and, obviously, could
not be availed of, on any rational legal theory, to support a charge of murder. How can
anyone, no matter how much of an outlaw he may be, have a criminal charge lodged
against him for the consequences of the lawful conduct of another person?" 391 Pa. at -,
137 A.2d at 483. This distinction has been generally criticized. "The Redline case ... expressly
overruled the Thomas decision, and, in limiting the Almeida case to its facts, cast serious
doubt as to its rationale." People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 53, 167 N.E.2d 736, 740, 201 N.Y.S.2d
328, 333 (1960). Another source notes that "the factual difference between victims . . .does
not produce a legal distinction justifying an opposite result; yet the majority refuses to
extend its holding possibly influenced by an emotional reluctance to let the killing of an
innocent bystander, even though excusable, go unpunished." 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 808, 810
(1958) (Emphasis omitted.); see 24 Mo. L. Rev. 266, 269 (1959); 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1176,
1179 (1958).
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distinguishing People v. Harrison (the killing of an innocent third person)
from the situation in issue, the dissent pointed out:
The rule that a killing perpetrated in an attempt to commit a felony is murder is
based upon the common-law principle that the intent to commit a felony suppliethe criminal intent or malice.... There is no logical basis for saying that the attempt
to commit a felony
implies malice between the two felons who are working in concert
27
with each other.
This distinction would lead to the conclusion that the accidental Idiling of
one felon by another during the commission of a felony would not be felony
murder.
In applying a proximate cause standard, the majority reasoned that since the
defendant initiated the original felony, he should be responsible for any death
stemming from the criminal conduct. People v. Harrison,cited as an authority for
this holding, makes an elaborate attempt to justify the minority view by means
of a proximate cause theory.2 The authorities cited by the Harrison court,
however, dealt with proximate cause in situations somewhat different from the
facts of that case. 9 That is, the lethal act and not simply the act of entering
into the original felony, was initiated by one of the felons, although other
intervening causes contributed to the death. By way of simple illustration, if
A is attempting to rob B, and a struggle for A's gun ensues in which B is
killed, A will not be heard to say that B's attempt to seize the gun from him
was such an intervening cause as to absolve him of liability o In such a case,
it is not unreasonable to say that A's act (pointing the gun at B) was the
proximate cause of B's death, and is unaffected by B's natural reaction in attempting to defend himself. However, it is quite another proposition to maintain, as did the Harrison court,3 1 that once a person enters into a felony, he
is the proximate cause for any death occurring during the res gestac of the felony.
Furthermore, the minority's position, in applying the tort standard of
proximate cause, becomes even more doubtful when it is realized
that proximate cause in criminal and civil cases differ because the theories behind the
limitation on liability in each are based upon a different premise, one upon a social
concept, of public interest and safety, and the other upon compensatory relief in
reference to whom should bear the loss as between two individuals. One is based upon
the welfare and safety of the state and its citizens in general, and the other when
to compensate an
individual for some harm done or whether to leave the parties where
32
they are found.
27. 40 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (dissenting opinion).
28. See note 11 supra.
29. One authority, in a criticism of the Harrison court states "that through a procez
of selection from a given area one may create and achieve that which is dezired and by
this process also develop the authority it seeks for its stated position." James, The Felony
Murder Doctrine, 1 Crim. L.Q. No. 2, 33, 46 (1963).
30. See People v. Manriquez, ISS Cal. 602, 206 Pac. 63 (1922).
31. 1 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
32. James, supra note 29, at 46. (Footnotes omitted.)
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Consequently, it would appear to be imprudent to apply strictly the same
standards originally developed for cases dealing with money damages, to those
criminal cases involving the charge of murder.
The minority view with respect to the liability of felons for the lethal acts of
others, can neither be justified in light of the common law origins of the crime
of felony"3 murder, nor on the grounds that such strict liability is necessary as
a deterrent to crime. Clearly in its original form, felony murder involved nothing
more than the transfer of a mens rea from the original crime to a death-dealing
act of the felon. However, presently in California, as a result of the Harrison
and Washington cases, not only the mens rea but the homicidal act itself will
be imputed to a felon, thus making the "apparent scope of the ...felony murder
rule . . . to be one of almost absolute liability."' 4 It is also somewhat questionable to argue that an imputation of the lethal acts of third persons to a
felon is necessary to deter crime. 35 Rather, it appears that such a view is a
return to an era when the punishment for a crime bore little relation to its
seriousness. 36 In short, the minority position, both legally and socially, lacks
sufficient justification.

Domestic Relations-New York Court Approves Use of Arbitration in
Custody Disputes.-The plaintiff and his wife entered into a separation agreement in 1962. Paragraph three of the agreement provided that custody of the
parties' two children be given to the wife, subject to specified visitation rights
33.

See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.

34. James, supra note 29, at 46. (Footnotes omitted.)
35. Professor Morris, in referring to the Almeida and Thomas cases, succinctly summarized the weakness of the "deterrence argument" when he stated that "the whole
theory of the deterrence of serious crimes by variations in the weight of the punishment
imposed on the perpetrators is so much in doubt as to make rational judgment on the
effect of this particular increased punishment doubly dubious. Furthermore, where it is
sought to increase the deterrent force of a punishment, it is usually accepted as wiser to
strike at the harm intended by the criminal rather than at the greater harm possibly flowing
from his act which was neither intended nor desired by him; that is to say, for the situations
before us, to increase penalties on felonies-particularly armed felonies-wherever retaliatory force can be foreseen, rather than on the relatively rarer occasions when the greater
harm eventuates." Morris, supra note 6, at 67.
36. Although part of the purpose of society's punishment of convicted criminals is
retributive, the fact remains that "all the striving of the law is to inflict a punishment commensurate with the crime . . . . For preventive purposes the penalties are increased with
the degree of social harm threatened . . . . [while] for retributive purposes the penalties are
increased with the viciousness of defendant's intent . . . . These purposes should not be
forgotten when the punishability of a defendant charged with homicide happens to turn
upon the outcome of a proximate cause inquiry. Assuming that his act has caused a death
in fact, its punishability as a homicide should be determined, not so much by the more or
less fortuitous course of events subsequent to the acting, as by the social menace of the
act and the viciousness of the actor's intent." Comment, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 659, 662-63 (1933).
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for the husband; that the parents should consult with each other on all matters
of importance relating to the children's health, welfare, and education; that
the husband be notified of the serious injury or illness of either child; and that
each party encourage the children's love and respect for the other. Another
clause in the agreement provided for arbitration of disputes arising within the
scope of paragraph three. Seeking punitive damages for alleged violation of
the provisions of paragraph three, the husband served a demand for arbitration
on the wife. Her motion to stay arbitration was granted by the supreme court.
The appellate division, first department, affirmed the order below noting that
a demand for punitive damages was clearly outside the scope of the arbitration
clause. In dictum, however, the court expressly approved the use of arbitration in custody and visitation disputes. Sheets v. Sheets, 22 App. Div. 2d 176,
254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Ist Dep't 1964).
Ultimate jurisdiction over custody questions has been a jealously guarded
prerogative of the courts. At common law, custody was considered an incident
of the guardianship of lands and in that light was closely tied to property
rights.' With the development of the idea that infants, as such, should be
protected by the courts, the Chancellor was deemed to have received from the
Crown its power as parens patriae to hear petitions regarding them 2 as an
additional remedy to traditional habeas corpus proceedings at law In both
types of proceedings the courts gradually came to apply a rule based on the
best interests of the child. In the words of Lord Esher in Queen v. Gyngal,
"the Court is placed in a position by reason of the prerogative of the Crown
to act as supreme parent of children, and must exercise that jurisdiction in the
manner in which a wise, affectionate, and careful parent would act for the
welfare of the child."z5
In the United States, equity courts have long exercised jurisdiction in
custody matters.6 The rule, as stated by Judge Cardozo, is: "Except when
adjudged as an incident to a suit for divorce or separation, the custody of
children is to be regulated as it has always been in one or other of two ways:
by writ of habeas corpus or by petition to the chancellor . . . . 7 It has been
1. See 25 Am. Jur. Guardian &Ward §§ 5, 6 (1940); Jacobs & Goebel, Casm on Domestic
Relations SSO-82 (4th ed. 1961); Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 423
(1964).
2. Ibid. The Common law view was that the father %was the natural guardian of the
child. It was not until 1339 that the Chancellor was empowered by statute to award custody

of children under seven to their mother. This has now been extended in England to age 21,
Id. at 424.

3. Since the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over marriage, custody could not te
decided as an incident of a matrimonial action.
4. E1S93] 2 Q.B. 232.
5. Id. at 241.
6. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 575 (156). See alzo Note, Custody of Minor
Children-Courts Power as Parens Patriae, 23 Albany L. Rev. 424, 432 (1959).
7. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 432, 14S N.E. 624, 626 (1925). Judge Cardozo also
noted: "The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction upon petition does not proceed upon
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held that a court's jurisdiction over custody matters survives the incorporation of a separation agreement providing for custody in a valid foreign divorce
decree, 8 and that a state court has jurisdiction over a child physically present
therein even though his residence or domicile or that of his parents is not in
that state. 9 Once made, a custody decree will not be modified without a clear
showing of a substantial change of circumstances and an equally strong indication that the best interests of the child require it. 10
The underlying principle, that "a child is not a chattel which may be used
as a consideration for an agreement of compromise,"" pervades the reasoning
of the courts in consistent holdings that they are not bound by the agreement
of the parties as to custody. Thus, in Hicks v. Bridges,'2 a New York court
entertained jurisdiction to fix the children's residence in New York even though
their mother had agreed to keep them in San Francisco and a California divorce
decree had directed her to do just that.' In Kunker v. Kunker, 4 the court
declared that parties to a matrimonial action can never finally contract with
respect to custody and their proper support and education. 15
Virtually no one disputes the ultimate jurisdiction of the courts with regard
to custody. Recently, however, a question has been raised as to the proper
the theory that the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action against
the other or indeed against any one. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for
the interest of the child. . . . He 'interferes for the protection of infants, qua infants . . .

Id. at 433-34, 148 N.E. at 626. (Italics omitted.)
8. People ex rel. Herzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39 N.E.2d 255 (1942); Spitz v.
Spitz, 39 Misc. 2d 934, 242 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Bastian v. Bastian, 130 Ohio Op.
2d 267, 160 N.E.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1959). The statement in Bachman v. Mejias, I N.Y.2d 575,
580, 136 N.E.2d 866, 868, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (1956), that "the full faith and credit
clause does not apply to custody decrees" has been criticized as going too far in its
statement of the rule. See Grad, Conflict of Laws, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1327, 1331 (1957).
For a general discussion of the conflicts of laws problems involved in custody decrees see
Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795 (1964).
9. The general rule as to the basis of jurisdiction in custody matters is that "a custody
contest is in the nature of an in rem proceeding; that the res is the custodial status of the
child . . . ." Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 14-84 (1964).
(Italics omitted.) See Paul v. Paul, 78 Idaho 370, 304 P.2d 641 (1956); Hicks v. Bridges,
2 App. Div. 2d 335, 155 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1st Dep't 1956).
10. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 70; Harwell v. Harwell, 253 Iowa 413, 112 N.W.2d 868
(1962).
11. Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 582, 136 N.E.2d 866, 869, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 908
(1956). See also Pratt v. Pratt, 363 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962) ; Commonwealth ex rel.
Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949).
12. 2 App. Div. 2d 335, 155 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1st Dep't 1956).
13. See also Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 128 S.E.2d 235 (1962); Taylor v. Taylor,
389 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1963).
14. 230 App. Div. 641 246 N.Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dep't 1930).
15. "Over these [support and education] the court has jurisdiction regardless of the agreement of the parties, for as to them the directions must be such 'as justice requires,' subject
to later modification." Id. at 645, 246 N.Y. Supp. at 123.
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forum for the initial hearing of a custody dispute. It has been suggested that
many parents are reluctant to "invoke the machinery of the law" in a custody
dispute because it is slow and expensive as 'ell as subject to publicity.' 0 One
alternate approach would use a committee, containing one member called a
child-ally (whose sole concern would be the needs and desires of the child) to
hear and decide the question. 17 Translating this idea into practical terms, it
has further been suggested that the committee approach might well be realized
by means of arbitration of custody disputes.'5
It was recognized prior to the present case that in New York, at least,
judicial precedent clearly militated against such an approach, since both custody
and visitation questions were unequivocably held to be nonarbitrable.19 In the
leading case on arbitration of custody questions, Hill v. Hil, 0° the separation
agreement provided that if one party moved out of New York City and no
agreement could be reached as to resettlement of custody or visitation rights,
arbitration would be held. When the wife notified her former husband of her
intention to move to Florida and take the children with her, and the husband
did not reply to her request for resettlement discussions, she served a demand
for arbitration upon him. Ruling on her motion to compel arbitration, the
Supreme Court said: "Lacking any compelling authority to support the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate custody and in the face of what appears
to be clear and authoritative condemnation of such method of determining
custody, the petitioner's application is denied."' 1 A few years later, in In the
Matter of MicIddan,2' - the supreme court refused to allow arbitration of a
dispute over visitation rights, declaring that a hearing by the court was the
only way for the best interests of the child to be determinedYm
In the thirteen years since Hill the climate for arbitration of matrimonial
matters has undoubtedly grown warmer. Though it was settled even before
16. Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legyal
InstrumenL 73 Yale L.j. 1197, 1198 (1964).
17. Ibid.
IS. Note, Committee Decision of Child Custody Disputes and the Judicial Test of
"Best Interests," 73 Yale L.J. 1201 (1964). This note was cited with approval in the instant
case. 22 App. Div. 2d at 177, 254 N..S.2d at 323.
19. Id. at 1207. The arbitrabilit, of custody disputes has apparently not been before

the courts in other states, but it is a question that could easily arise, epcdally in the
twenty states whose arbitration satutes specifically provide for the arbitration of future
disputes. They are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Maryland vill become
the twenty-first State with a modem arbitration law vhen its statute becomes effective on
June 1, 1965. See American Arbitration Ass'n, Arbitration News, No. 5, p. 1, 1965.
20. 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
21. Id. at 1039; 104 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 60S (Sup. CL 1954).
23. Id. at 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d at 60S.
22.
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Hill that questions of wife support were arbitrable, 24 child support and corollary
questions were generally considered nonarbitrable. 25 Then, in 1960, the court
20
in Freidberg v. Freidberg
held the education of the couple's son and the
payment of his tuition fees to be arbitrable issues. The court expressly distinguished Michelman apparently on the theory that the education of the
child did not go to the heart of the custody question. Under the typical court
reasoning, as illustrated by Kunker v. Kunker,27 this distinction would not
have been tenable unless the courts were already beginning
to look for a less
28
rigid rule regarding arbitration of custody questions.
The decision in the instant case signals a new attitude regarding custody
problems. It does not mean, however, that the courts intend to abdicate their
common-law ultimate jurisdiction over infants. 29 Thus, though one of the
chief advantages of the arbitration process is its finality,30 the court pointed
out that an arbitration award involving custody would always be subject to
review by the courts on the question of the child's best interests.8 ' It noted
that any provision of the award could be challenged in court by a parent,
interested relative, or the child himself through a friend. On such application
24. Wife support was arbitrable whether it involved the fixing of the amount to be
paid or the enforcement of an existing provision. See In the Matter of Robinson, 296 N.Y.
778, 71 N.E.2d 214 (1947) (memorandum decision); In the Matter of Luttinger, 294 N.Y.
855, 62 N.E.2d 487 (1945) (memorandum decision); Zuckerman v. Zuckerman, 96 N.Y.S.2d
190 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
25. See Lindey, op. cit. supra note 9, § 29-15: "[lIt would seem that child-support Is
not arbitrable. But the point is by no means settled. For one thing, the law is evolving; the
trend is toward enlarging the scope of arbitrable issues, so as to relieve the over-burdened
courts. For another, there are conflicting unreported decisions in the lower courts." See
American Arbitration Ass'n, Lawyers' Arbitation Letter, Nov. 15, 1961, in which it is
noted that contrary decisions were reached in two cases involving child support. In Dowell
v. Berger (Sup. Ct.) in N.Y.LJ., June 6, 1952, p. 16, col. 3, the question of support payments for children was considered arbitrable. In another case, Dianda v. Volkman, (Suffolk
County Ct.) in N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1952, p. 16, col. 1, a motion to compel arbitration of a
dispute involving child support was denied. The Dianda case has been distinguished on the
ground that the Children's Court had already ordered the defendant to pay a certain
sum for support. Lindey notes that in the only high court case involving arbitration of child
support it was denied on very narrow grounds and the court did not specifically rule out
arbitration of the question. See Lindey, op. cit. supra note 9, citing In the Matter of Matsner,
301 N.Y. 699, 95 N.E.2d 53 (1950) (memorandum decision).
26. 23 Misc. 2d 196, 201 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
27. 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N.Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dep't 1930) ; see notes 14 & 15 supra and
accompanying text.
28. See Lindey, op. cit. supra note 9, § 29-4.
29. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
30. The courts will not review an arbitration award on the law or on the facts. Only
if the arbitrator has been guilty of fraud, misconduct, or partiality can the award be vacated.
See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. 7511; see also Domke, Commercial Arbitration 96-99 (1965).
31. 22 App. Div. 2d at 178, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
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the court would examine the matter de novo
and decide what action was
' 32
"necessary for the best interests of the child."

This approach to custody disputes does not have the unanimous approval
of the bar.as It has been suggested that "no one individual other than a court
should have the last word to determine the basic questions of who shall have
custody of a child or how the health and general welfare of a child can best
be protected. '34 There is no doubt that if the dictum in Sheets is followed in
New York, arbitration clauses covering cutody, heretofore inserted by attorneys
in separation agreements for their "psychological effect,"''3 will now be invokable and the resultant awards largely enforceable without further hearing.
Whether this method of resolving custody problems involves a greater danger
to the child than a hearing in a judge's chamber cannot, at this juncture, be
fully known. Certainly the attorney who draws a separation agreement which
includes an arbitration clause should pay particular attention to that clause.
For example, to utilize the committee approach, he may want to write an
arbitration clause providing that each party name one arbitrator and that a
specified agency 30 name the third. If he does this, the clause should specify
32. Id. at 179, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 324. The court noted that of a typical list of items that
might be arbitrated, including visitation rights of the father on one day of the week rather
than another, the place where a child's clothes should be purchased, whether the child
should be accompanied to school by a parent or nurse, whether he should have a particular,
or no, religious training, or whether he should go to a camp at sea level or in the mountains,
only those which could affect his interests adversely would be subject to reiev. The court
pointed out that of all the items in the above mentioned list only those involving religious
training and, in some instances, a summer camp would so qualify. Ibid.
33. See Perles, The Effect of the Sheets Case on Agreements to Arbitrate Problems Involving Children, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 4.
34. Ibid. An alternate plan suggested by this attorney would be for separation agreements
to be drafted making submission of the disputed questions to qualified mediator- a condition precedent to litigation. The mediators' opinion would be advisory, and binding on
neither the court nor the parents. The benefit of such a plan would be that the parents
would have the advice of disinterested parties without any waiver of legal rights. In reply
to this suggestion, it has been proposed that an arbitration agency such as the American
Arbitration Association might be able to provide facilities for a combined arbitrationmediation approach. See Letter from Robert Coulson, Executive Vice-Preifdent of the
American Arbitration Association, to Warren Moscow, Editor of the New York Law Journal,
Feb. 2, 1965, p. 4, col. 3. Conciliation procedures have also been advocated as an ideal way
of settling custody problems, even where it has been agreed by all that divorce is the best
solution. See McIntyre, Conciliation of Disrupted Marriages by or Through the Judiciary,
4 J. Fain. Law 117, 129 (1964). It is noted there that although the New York Legislature
passed the Family Court Act in 1962, the courts have yet to set up the facilities or procedures for a full-fledged conciliation program. Id. at 119 n.6.
35. Perles, op. cit. supra note 33.
36. E.g., the American Arbitration Association. Under the Commercial Arbitration Rules
of that Association, parties to an arbitration proceeding may provide for a single arbitrator
or for a three-man panel. If they choose the latter, they may require that each party nomi-
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exactly what type of person is felt by the parents to be most desirable-his
occupation, religious affiliation, and even his age, should the parties have strong
feelings on any of these matters. A clearly written and specific clause will make
easier the resolution of future disputes.
It is submitted that the Sheets dictum provides no ground for apprehension.
A well-drafted arbitration agreement will insure a qualified, mutually-acceptable
panel of arbitrators. In the background the court stands ready to exercise its
paternal jurisdiction. And the flexibility of procedure which is possible is bound
to result in more imaginative treatment of the human problems that make up
a custody dispute.

Evidence-Defendant in a Malpractice Action Compelled to Give Expert
Testimony.-Pursuant to the advice of defendant doctors, plaintiff underwent
three operations to correct a corneal condition. The operations worsened plaintiff's condition to the point where plaintiff became blind in one eye.' In her
action against the doctors and the hospital for malpractice, plaintiff sought
to elicit the expert testimony of defendant doctors. The trial court sustained
objections to all such questions and nonsuited plaintiff for failure of proof.
The appellate division affirmed. 2 The court of appeals granted a new trial,
holding that plaintiff in a malpractice action is entitled to elicit and rely on
the expert testimony of the defendant. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear &
Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).
At common law a party could not compel his adversary to testify.8 In an
early New York case, Mauran v. Lamb, 4 the court stated that a party would
not be compelled to make himself civilly liable.; However, this rule has long
since been abandoned and expressly superseded by legislative enactments which
provide that a party to a civil action shall not be excluded or excused from
being a witness because of his interest, G nor will he be excused from answering
nate his own arbitrator and that the two nominees name the third, or that the Association
name the third. Or, if they prefer, they may provide for a completely neutral panel of three
arbitrators to be chosen from the panels of the Association. See §§ 12-14 of the Commercial
Arbitration Rules (1964).
1. Plaintiff claimed in her malpractice action that Doctors Schachat and Kleinhandler
had misrepresented the possible outcome of the operation and that the decision of Doctors
Doctor, Paton and Kleinhandler to operate was contrary to professionally acceptable practice
in light of her condition.
2. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 16 App. Div. 2d 374, 228 N.Y.S.2d
143 (1st Dep't 1962).
3. 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2217, 2218 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
4. 7 Cow. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
5. Id. at 177-78.
6. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. 4512: "Except as otherwise expressly prescribed, a person
shall not be excluded or excused from being a witness, by reason of his interest in the event
or because he is a party . .. .
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a relevant question solely on the ground that "the answer may tend to establish that he owes a debt or is otherwise subject to a civil suit.'M The purpose
of these legislative enactments is to promote the presentation to the jury of
all relevant facts.8 The function of the courts in deciding controversies should
not be thwarted or delayed simply because the pertinent information in the
possession of a party happens to be prejudicial to his case.
An independent expert may be required to testify in his lay capacity just
as any other lay witness. Although he may voluntarily voice his professional
opinion, i.e., give expert testimony, he will not be compelled to do so. In
formulating this rule, the New York Court of Appeals in People e. rel. Kraushaar
Bros. v. Thorpe,'0 reasoned that if the independent expert could be compelled
to give his expert opinion in every similar controversy he might be subjected
to the considerable hardship of having to appear in every such controversyin effect, penalizing him for his skill or knowledge."1 In a case such as the
present one, where the adverse party is himself an expert, the rule permitting
a party to compel his adversary to testify and the rule prohibiting compulsory
expert testimony must be juxtaposed. The discord among the decisions in
jurisdictions outside New York1' seems to arise from this juxtaposition. Many
of these decisions are based on the incorrect assumption that the rule compelling an adverse party to testify, if called as a witness, to all relevant facts,
conflicts with the rule which prevents a witness from being compelled to testify
as an expert, notwithstanding the relevancy of his testimony.
In most states the rules permitting and governing the examination of an
adverse party are statutory in nature. Some statutes provide that the examination
of an adverse party will be governed by the rules applicable to other witnesses. 13
This has led to much disparity in decisions within and among the various
7. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. 4501.
8. 15 N.Y.2d at 27, 203 N.E.2d at 473, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
9. Expert testimony will be necessary in "cases in which the conclusions to be drawn from
the facts stated, as well as knowledge of the facts themselves, depend upon professional or
scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence."
Dougherty v. Milliken, 163 N.Y. 527, 533, 57 N.E. 757, 759 (190D). See also leislman v.
Crown Heights Hosp., 235 N.Y. 389, 396, 34 N.E.2d 367, 371 (1941) (malpractice) ; see
generally Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 403 (1935).
10. 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947) (tax certiorari; independent expert, who had

made an appraisal for previous owners of the property not compelled to testify).
11.

Ibid.; Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1377)

(criminal trial for rape in which appellant

doctor was called as an expert witness). As an additional reason for its holding the court, in
Buchnman, noted that "'it is evident that the skill and professional experience of a man are

so far his individual capital and property, that he cannot be compelled to bestow it
gratuitously upon any party."' Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
12. See cases cited in 15 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 203 N.E.2d at 473, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
13. E.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 9-1206 (Supp. 1963); Alinn. Stat. Ann. § 595.03 (Supp. 19G4);
N.J. Rev. StaL § 2A:31-11 (1951): "Except as otherwise provided by law, when any party

is called as a witness by the adverse party he shall be subject to the same rules as to examination and cross-examination as other witnesses."
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jurisdictions. 1 4 Since one of the rules applicable to "other witnesses" invariably
prohibits compulsory expert testimony, some courts have concluded that this
right of an expert to remain silent on certain matters is of paramount importance. The scope of testimony capable of being elicited from the adverse
15
party is, therefore, limited accordingly. Under such an interpretation the
would have been limited to a mere
case
instant
the
in
doctors
the
testimony of
description of the actual treatment rendered. Consequently, the doctors would
not have been compelled to answer hypothetical questions as to what the usual
medical procedure might be in such instances. In other states, however, the
courts have held that since the purpose of the adverse witness statute is to
bring all relevant information before the court, the rule respecting compulsory
10
expert testimony should have no application to the adverse party. It is to
be noted that this will not subject an expert to involuntary appearances in court
since the exception is in favor of the adverse party.
The instant case is one of first impression in New York. Unlike other state
statutes which attempt to set down guidelines governing the examination of an
7
adverse party, the New York statute merely permits such examinations.' The
court, therefore, in seeking a determination, correctly turned to the rules as
evincing solutions to problems of evidentiary procedure. The foreign state decisions which have reached a result contrary to the one here, have been based
18
solely on the language appearing in their adverse witness statutes. These
courts have merely superimposed the rules applicable to independent experts
upon the adverse party statutes without seeking to understand the concept behind these rules. A proper discussion of the issue need not consider the adverse
party statute at all since the adverse party expert is, irrespective of his being
14. Compare Walker v. Distler, 78 Idaho 38, 296 P.2d 452 (1956) (compelling the adverse
party to testify as an expert on cross-examination in a childbirth malpractice action), with
Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967 (1913) (malpractice case; adverse party not
compelled to testify as an expert on cross-examination); compare Lashley v. Koerber, 26
Cal. 2d 83, 156 P.2d 441 (1945), and Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944),
and Harnden v. Mischel, 63 N.D. 122, 246 N.W. 646 (1933), with Ericksen v. Wilson, 266
Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963), and Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915
(1931), and Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938).
15. Such was the rule set down by the New Jersey court in Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L.
511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944). In this action for wrongful death due to negligence,
the court, sustaining objections to questions relating to hypothetical methods of treatment,
concluded that "there is no authority for excluding the defendant ... from the protection of
the statute [respecting compulsory expert testimony] because he is a party to the litigation . . . ." Id. at 517, 37 A.2d at 56. In a recent Minnesota malpractice action, Ericksen v.
Wilson, supra note 14, a similar decision was reached.
16. Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944) ; State v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156,
167 A.2d 117 (1961) (wrongful death due to malpractice).
17. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. 4512, quoted in note 6 supra.
18. E.g., Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931); Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d
869 (1938).
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made an adverse party witness, an interested party who will be present during
the proceedings. Furthermore, the testimony given by the adverse party expert
will not entail an expenditure of research time to acquaint him with the facts
of the case, one of the grounds asserted for refusing to compel an independent
expert to testify.'9
Another factor asserted by the court in reaching its conclusion was that a
plaintiff will not, in most cases, elect to rely on the testimony of the defendant
doctor, but will rather do so out of necessity,20 for, as was noted in one opinion:
Anyone familiar with cases of this character [malpractice] knows the so-called ethical
practitioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff regardless of the merits of hiN
case. This is largely due to the pressure exerted by medical societies and public
liability insurance companies which issue policies of liability insurance to physicians
covering malpractice claims. . . . [P]hsicians .. .flock to the defense of their
fellow member charged with malpractice and the plaintiff is relegated, for his exp2rt
testimony, to the occasional lone wolf or heroic soul, who for the sake of truth and
justice has the courage to run the risk of ostracism by his fellow practitioners and
the cancellation of his public liability insurance policy. 21
However, there are two notable shortcomings inherent in this argument. Firstly,
plaintiffs have succeeded in acquiring independent medical experts to testify in
malpractice actions- 2 Secondly, this reasoning may tend to limit the instant
holding to malpractice cases. This would be an unjustified limitation for, in
light of the interpretation given to the expert witness and adverse party witness rules, the holding should apply equally in any case requiring expert testimony23 and not be limited to malpractice cases.
While it is true that as a result of the instant decision a plaintiff might
tend to rely solely on the defendant for expert testimony, thus saving the time
and expense involved in procuring his own expert, there is nothing "unsporting"
in this technique since it is presumed that the defendant will testif, most
favorably to himselfY4 It is also assumed that in naming a doctor as a defendant
the plaintiff will do so in good faith. However, if this were not the case, and
plaintiff merely sued a doctor as co-defendant because his testimony would be
favorable, the doctor could move for summary judgment and get the action dismissed as against him.-5 Therefore, the possibilities of abusing the court's ruling
19. People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 72 X.E 2d 165 (1947 .
20. 1' %.Y.2d at 27-23, 203 N.E.2d at 474, 255 N.Y.S.ld at 71-72.
21. Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1q51) ICarter, J.,
dissenting). See Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 325, S2S (D.C. Cir. 19411.
22. Mleiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 3S9, 34 N.E2d 367 (1941); 'Moss v,
Wmkler, 4 App. Div. 2d 852, 166 N.N.S.2d 4S5 (4th Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision)
23. State v. Kurtz, 143 So. 2d 761 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (independent appraiser employed
by the adverse party compelled to give expert testimony as to the value of real estate);
Harnden v. AMischel, 63 NJ). 122, 246 N.W. 646 (1933) (epert opinion as to value of
automobile).
24. 15 N.X.2d at 28, 203 N.E.2d at 474, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 72.

25. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law &R. 3212.
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will be greatly minimized. In the present case one of the defendants had
written a book which contained information favorable to plaintiff. 20 By calling
him, plaintiff could expect either to get him to repeat this information or, if
he tried to assert a contrary opinion, to impeach him with these prior contradictory statements in the book. Thus, as a practical matter, plaintiffs will avail
themselves of the instant holding only when the potentially detrimental testimony of the defendant can be impeached either by his prior contradictory statement or by another expert.
The appellate division, 27 holding that the defendant would not be compelled to testify as an expert, found an incongruity in that the net result of
such an action would be that "the plaintiff invites the jury to be guided by a
standard furnished by a source condemned by her. ' u 8 This, however, fails to
take into account two basic facts: that some expert testimony is necessary in a
malpractice action, and that by impeaching and interrogating his adversary,
a party can establish some standard against which the jury can measure the
defendant's performance. 29 The importance of the holding, therefore, lies not
in the wider latitude it affords a party in examining his adversary, but rather
in the recognition it gives to the fact that there is no reason to limit the scope
of such examination so as to exclude expert testimony.

Labor Law-National Labor Relations Board Affords Administrative Relief for Union Racial Discrimination.-In 1961, the National Labor Relations
Board certified Locals 1 and 2, Independent Metal Workers Union, as the joint
bargaining representative of the employees at Hughes Tool Co. Petitioner
was a member of Local 2, which represented the Negro employees of the company; Local 1 represented the white employees. After the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement,' in which all the parties had participated,
Local 1 and the employer agreed to extend and amend the agreement, and
established new apprenticeships. All the parties were aware that these positions
were to be available only to white employees.
Petitioner submitted a bid for one of the apprenticeships, but his name was
omitted from the list of applicants. He then asked Local 1 to intercede on his
behalf, but his request went unanswered. Petitioner then filed a charge that
Local l's failure to act on his grievance violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) 2 of the
26. 15 N.Y.2d at 24, 203 N.E.2d at 472, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
27. 16 App. Div. 2d 374, 228 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1st Dep't 1962).
28.

Id. at 379, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 149.

29. Kelley v. Wasserman, 5 N.Y.2d 425, 428-29, 158 N.E.2d 241, 243, 185 N.Y.S.2d 538,
541 (1959).
1. Clear lines delineating the scope of each local's responsibility were established by
contract with the employer, and jobs were divided into two categories, one group of jobs
being open only to white employees, the other only to Negroes.
2. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958): "It shall be an unfair labor
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National Labor Relations Act. 3 After the General Counsel issued a complaint
on this charge, Local 2 filed a motion for the rescission of the certification
issued to Locals 1 and 2 on the ground that Local 1 had discriminated against
the Negro members of the bargaining unit because of their race. The Board
consolidated the two proceedings. The trial examiner held that Local l's action
in failing to process petitioner's grievance violated sections 8(b)(1)(A),
8(b) (2),4 and 8(b)(3) 5 of the NLRA. On appeal, the NLRB upheld the trial
examiner's decision and withdrew certification of both locals on the ground that
Locals 1 and 2 practiced racial discrimination when determining membership.0
Metal Workers Union (Hughes Tool Co.), 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964).
Although both the majority and the minority of the NLRB agreed that
Local 1 had violated section 8(b) (1) (A), their conclusions were based on
different theories. The majority adopted the trial examiner's holding that the
union's failure to process an employee's grievance constituted a refusal to represent him, and therefore, "restrained or coerced him in his exercise of his right
to be represented."'7 It strongly condemned a failure to process a grievance on
the basis of racial considerations, and stated that by Local l's "failure to
entertain in any fashion or to consider the grievance filed by an employee in
the bargaining unit, Ivory Davis, and by its outright rejection of Davis' grievance
for reasons of race, [Local 1] violated section 8 (b) (1) (A) ....,,
In essence, this was a reiteration of the doctrine recently announced by the
NLRB in Miranda Fuel Co.0 In Miranda, the Board held that the failure of a
practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce . . . employees

in the e-xercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respct to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein . ..

."

(Italics omitted.)

3. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §9 151-63
(1953S), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-60 (Supp. V, 1964).
4. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 15S(b) (2) (1958): "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents . . . to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to dizscriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership .... "
5. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)(3) (1958): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with an
employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provision5
of section 9(a) . ..."

6. Any violations occurring as a result of the fact that there may have been a discriminatory contract present are not in issue, because, as the trial examiner pointed out,
"General Counsel expressly disclaimed any allegation that Local 1 violated the Act by
executing the contract .... " Metal Workers Union, 56 L.R.R.M. 12S9, 1291 (1964).
7. Id. at 1291.
s. Id. at 1292. (Emphasis added.)
9. 140 N.L.R.B. 1S1 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). A union
truck driver asked his employer for a leave of absence which was to be effective feveral day3
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statutory bargaining representative to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit constituted an unfair labor practice. The Board readied this result by
first finding that section 9(a) 10 of the act imposed upon the bargaining agent
an obligation to represent fairly all employees in the unit.1 ' It then read this
obligation into the section 712 right of employees "to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing"1 3 and reached the conclusion that the
employees are given, under section 7, "the right to be free from unfair or
irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters
affecting their employment."' 4 The Board concluded that it had jurisdiction
over a charge involving such treatment since a union violation of section 7
is an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1) (A). 1
The court of appeals, however, denied enforcement of the Board's order in
Miranda, Judge Medina taking specific exception with the Board's theory of
"fair representation."' 1 Miranda represents the only judicial test of the Board's
prior to a date specified in a union-employer contract allowing employees to go on leave
and still maintain their seniority rights. The employer granted the request, but the union
demanded that the driver's seniority be reduced, and the employer acquiesced in the demand.
10. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958).
11. The doctrine of fair representation has been applied in the federal courts. E.g,,
Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
338 U.S. 232 (1949) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944);
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
12. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958): "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3)."
13. Ibid.
14. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
15. On the general question of the right of an employee to be represented fairly, there
seems little doubt. However, there is a difference of opinion as to whether this right should
be enforced by the federal courts, the state courts, state labor agencies, or the NLRB under
the NLRA. See generally, Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435
(1963); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility In
a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327 (1958). Even those who feel that the problem of
fair representation belongs before the Board, differ as to what theory, if any, would properly
sustain the Board's jurisdiction. Compare, Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National
Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16th Annual Conference on
Labor 3 (Christensen ed. 1963), and Sovern, The NLRA and Racial Discrimination, 62
Colum. L. Rev. 563 (1962), wvith Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151
(1957).
16. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1963). For the reasons
why the other Judges did not rule on the theory, see the concurring opinion of Judge
Lumbard (id. at 180), and the dissenting opinion of Judge Friendly. Ibid.

1965]

CASE NOTES

fair representation theory. However, the Supreme Court, in rejecting a Board

decision that found a hiring hall provision in a union-employer collective
bargaining contract per se illegal, stated that where "Congress has aimed its

sanctions only at specific discriminatory practices, the Board cannot go further
and establish a broader, more pervasive regulatory scheme."", Section 7 makes

no specific mention of any right to fair representation. Therefore, the Supreme
Court's statement, in reference to the finding of a hiring hall provision per se

illegal, would seem equally applicable in the instant case.
Further, the NLRA, as originally enacted, contained no prohibitions aganst
union activities. The Taft-Hartley Act 18 which added union unfair labor practices to the NLRA, supplemented section 7 only insofar as giving the employees
the right to refrain from union activity. This would not have the effect of imposing a duty of fair representation on a union. The mere fact that an aggrieved
employee who claims that he has not been represented fairly may be financially'0
or procedurally 20 better off before the N7LRB than if he had gone to the courts
for relief would seem an insufficient reason for off-setting plain statutory
language. 2 '
The Board, however, has continued to apply the fair representation theory, and has taken
specific exception with the circuit court's decision. "With due deference to the Circuit
Court's opinion, we adhere to our previous decision until such time as the Supreme Court
of the United States rules otherwise." Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 57 LR.R.M,
1083, 105 n.7 (1964). See also Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 57 L.R.R.M 1535 I19l4)
17. Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 66i7, 676 (1961).
18. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1953), as amended, 29 U-SoC,
§§ 153-60 (Supp. V, 1964).
19. Since the XLRB, after a charge has been filed, handles the prosecution of an unfair
labor practice, an aggrieved employee need not bear the expense of trial or counsel.
20. The principal difficulty that arises in suing a union is that which is found in suing
any unincorporated association: The problem of obtaining a binding judgment against the
association's treasury in the face of the common law requirement of showing that all the
association's members concurred in the alleged wrongful act. See Millis & Katz, A Decade
of State Labor Legislation 1937-1947, 15 U. Chli. L. Rev. 282, 305 (1947). Hiler v. Liquor
Salesmen's Union, 338 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1964), would seem to obviate this problem It held
that an employee may sue the union in respect to a violation of fair reprezentation and
obtain a binding judgment on the union treasury under § 301 of the NLRA, 61 StaL 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (195S). See also Smith v. Evening News Vs'n, 371 U.S. 195, 2C
(1962).
Further, it has been held that § 301 is substantive rather than procedural, Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 44S (1957), and that when dealing with a contract under
§ 301, federal law supersedes state law, Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co,
369 US. 95 (1962). However the problem would still seem to exist where the suit was not
within the purview of § 301.
21. If the Board does have jurisdiction over a breach of the duty to represent fairly, it
may be argued that both the state and federal courts are excluded from dealing with thin
issue. "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § S of the Act, the States as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board .... ." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The
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22
Legislative intent offers no additional support for the rmajority's theory.
As late as 1959, when Congress passed the Labor-Management Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin Act),23 some twenty-four years after the NLRA and twelve
years after the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress had the opportunity to include a
section making a breach of the duty to represent fairly an unfair labor practice.
They did not do so. At the time that Congress considered the Landrum-Griffin
Act, the Supreme Court had already established the judicial duty of fair representation. It would seem that had Congress desired the Board to have jurisdiction over fair representation matters they would have included some indication of that in the Landrum-Griffin Act. In addition, if Congress had intended
the NLRB to protect workers' rights to fair representation, and to have
jurisdiction over matters arising as a result of racial discrimination in union
membership, why did they find it necessary to include a section barring racial
create a new Board to enforce said
discrimination in union membership, and
24

section, in the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning, composing the minority, based
their finding of a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) on Local l's refusal to
process petitioner's grievance because he was not a member of the local. Clearly,
a refusal to prosecute a grievance of a member of the bargaining unit on the
ground that he is not a member of the union constitutes coercion on the part
of the union
with respect to the employee's right to refrain from union
25
activities.
The minority also indicated that the new doctrine adopted by the majority
would expand the Board's jurisdiction into new areas, and it doubted whether
the Board has either the requisite experience or knowledge to deal with such
matters. 26 One observer, in discussing the Board's theory of fair representation,
has stated that there will be many "practical difficulties facing both unions
and government should the latter attempt to determine and outlaw any action
by a union which is 'unfair.' ',27
Court, however, has held that where the breach of the duty of fair representation arises
from an employer-union contract, it may be treated as having arisen under § 301 of the
NLRA, and the state and federal courts have jurisdiction. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335 (1964).
22. "The 1947 Congress intentionally rejected an amendment to the NLRA that would
have directly enforced workers' rights to fair representation by a section 8 unfair labor practice proceeding." Note, Administrative Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: The
Miranda Case, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711, 721 (1964).
23. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. V, 1963).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 703, 705-06, 78 Stat. 255, 258-59, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2,
-4, -5 (1964).
25. Confectionary Union v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Die & Tool
Makers Lodge, 231 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1956).
26. 56 L.R.R.M. at 1299 (separate opinion). The Board minority, however, did not
indicate who they thought would be more qualified than themselves to handle the fair
representation problem, since the subject to be considered encompasses labor problems, an
area in which they are considered expert.
27. Christensen, Labor Relations Law, 1963 Ann. Survey Am. L. 103, 126. (Emphasis
added.)
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The Board was also divided as to violations of sections 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (3).
The majority rested its positive finding of a violation of section S(b) (3) on the
ground that when Local 1 failed to process the employee's grievance it, in effect,
refused to bargain collectively.2 The majority adopted the trial examiner's
reasoning that since an employer owes a duty to bargain not only to the
employees' statutory bargaining representatives, but to the individual employees
as well, and since the statutory representative owes a duty to bargain with the
employer, it must follow that the statutory representative also owes the duty
to bargain with the employer to the individual employees.
The only case that the Board cited to support the proposition that the employer's duty to bargain with the union extends to the employees was NLRB v.
Louisville Refining Co.29 This case fails to evidence any support for the contention that this duty is owed to the employees.23 The mere fact that the employer owes the duty to bargain to the union, and the union owes the employer
a corresponding duty, would not, without some further indicia, give rise to
the proposition that the union owes this duty to the employees as well.
Section 8(d) 31 defines the term bargaining collectively for the purposes of
section 8, and contains no wording which would indicate that the failure to
process the grievance of a member of the bargaining unit may constitute a
failure to bargain in violation of the statute.
The legislative history of the section indicates that a different result should
have been reached. Congress merely intended, in passing section S(b)(3), to
make the union's duty to bargain reciprocal with that of the employer's duty
to bargain with the union. 32 Further, the Supreme Court has adopted this
interpretation of legislative intent. 33 There was no mention in said history
of the fact that a union's failure to process an employee's grievance should be
considered a violation of the union's duty to bargain.
With respect to the section 8(b) (2) violation, the majority adopted the
trial examiner's holding that because Local 1 did not process Davis' grievance
28. "A refusal to process a grievance is ... a refusal to bargain." 56 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
29. 102 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1939).

30. In this case the employer refused to bargain with representatives of a national union,
even though they were the designated representatives of his employees. The employer
offered two defenses for his actions. First he claimed that he had not been officially notified
in writing that the union was the choice of his employees. Second, he claimed that he was
willing to bargain with a "local" union rather than the national. The court held these
defenses insufficient. The obligation here can be recoznized as the normal duty that the
employer owes to the bargaining agent of his employees to bargain with such agent.
31. "[To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer

in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution

of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party,
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession .

. . ."

61 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).

32. See 93 Cong. Rec. 333 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); 93 Cong. Rec. 4133 (1947)
(remarks of Senator Ellander).
33. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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it caused, or attempted to cause, the employer to violate section 8(a)(3).'
The Board relied on Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 3r where the union had
negotiated a contract with the employer that called for the payment of additional benefits to union members. The employer defended his distribution of
these benefits on the theory that union membership was closed 30 and, therefore, he could not possibly encourage or discourage membership in the union
by his distribution of additional benefits to the present union members. The
Court rejected this defense on the ground that union membership requirements
were subject to change and the employer could not take action that tended 37
to encourage union membership. The instant case, however, can be distinguished
from Radio Officers'. In Radio Officers' the union asked the employer to distribute
additional benefits to union members and not to other members of the bargaining
unit, and the employer complied with its request. Here, with respect to the union's
failure to process petitioner's grievance, the Board claimed that the union had
caused, or attempted to cause the employer to violate section 8(a) (3) without
asking the employer to do, or refrain from doing, anything.
The Board's determination rescinding the certification of both locals seems
well founded. Union-employer contracts involving racial discrimination have
long been judicially condemned. 38 These rulings have been made applicable
40
39
to unions operating within the sphere of the NLRA. In Pioneer Bus Co.,
the Board rescinded certification of a union which had drawn contracts with
the employer on a racially discriminatory basis. In the present case, the
majority went further 4 ' and specifically overturned prior Board decisions4 "
34. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1964): "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization .
35.

347 U.S. 17 (1954).

36. Membership in the union was open only to the sons of persons who were already
existing members.
37. The proposition that an employer's actions are illegal if they even tend to encourage
membership in unions, rather than the act being done in order to encourage union membership was contested by Justices Black and Douglas. See 347 U.S. at 57-58 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
38. See cases cited note 11 supra.
39. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam).
40. 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
41. The majority also set forth the proposition that racial discrimination in union membership may constitute a violation of § 8(b). "[R]acial segregation in membership, when
engaged in by . . . a representative, cannot be countenanced by a Federal Agency and may
violate Section 8(b)." 56 L.R.R.M. at 1293.
This poses an interesting problem because a close look at § 8(b) fails to reveal justification
for the Board's statement. There are two subsections that deal directly with qualifications
for union membership, one dearly inapplicable in this instance, § 8(b) (5), 61 Stat. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (5) (1958), which prohibits the union from charging excessive initiation
fees of employees covered by an agreement, and the other seemingly in direct opposition to
the Board's contention, § 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958),
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which had allowed the certification of unions which were established along
racially discriminatory lines. The Board stated that it could no longer render
aid to a bargaining agent that discriminates on the basis of race 3 The decision
has adequate support in Supreme Court casesY14 Although Congress had no
intention to regulate racial requirements for union membership at the time the
Taft-Hartley Law was proposed, 45 it is clear enough that the Court's decisions
prohibiting enforcement of racial discrimination by the state or federal governments4" would be equally applicable to a federal administrative agency.
With respect to the Board's handling of racial discrimination under the
general area of fair representation, a different conclusion must be reached. This
is not to say that all questions dealing with racial discrimination should be
placed outside the Board's jurisdiction. However, in light of the dubious
status of the Board's fair representation theory, and the propect of increasing
the Board's work load so that it might take as long as three years to get a
decision on an NTLRB action, 47 would it not be better to adopt the thinldng
which says: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7:
Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the rights of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein...."
One observer has stated that this section means that "a union can probably refuse to admit
an applicant . . . for any or no reason whatsoever . .

."

(Italics omitted.) See :Manoff,

Labor Relations Law 122 (1955); see also note 45 infra.
42. Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1945); Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.LB,
1075 (1945).
43. "We hold too, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the certification should ba
rescinded because Locals Nos. 1 and 2 discriminated on the basis of race in determining
eligibility for full and equal membership, and segregated their members on the b-is of
race." 56 L.R.R.M. at 1294.
44. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (prohibiting state courts from enforcing
private racially discriminatory contracts); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 US. 24 (1945) (prohibition
extended to federal courts).
45. Senator Taft, during Congressional discussion of the bill, stated: "Let us take the
case of unions which prohibit the admission of Negroes to membership. If they prohibit
the admission of Negroes to membership, they may continue to do so ...

."

93 Cong. Rec

4193 (1947). That membership requirements, in general, were not planned to be regulated
is also evident. Referring to § S(b) (1) of the then proposed Taft-Hartley Act, the Senate
Committee considering the bill stated that: "It is to be observed that unions are free to
adopt whatever membership provisions they desire . . . ..S. Rep. No. 10S, Eath Cong.,
1st Sess. 21 (1947). The Committee clearly indicated legislative intent when they stated:
"The committee did not desire to limit the labor organization with respect to either its
selection of membership or expulsion therefrom." Id. at 20.
46. See, e.g., Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 US. 379 (1955) (per curiam), reversing
223 F.2d 93 (5 Cir. 1955) (public golf course); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (state public schools); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 US. 497 (1954) (federal public
schools); Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 3M6 (4th Cir.) (par
curiam), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 377 (1955) (public beaches); Browder v. Gayle, 142
F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (public transportation).
47. One commentator, discussing the Board's work load prior to its adoption of the
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"that although Congress never intended the National Labor Relations Act
to encompass union-caused racial discrimination as an unfair labor practice, the
Board could take cases where the discrimination was based upon union membership considerations. '48 An example of such cases would be where the union
causes the employer to discriminate against a member of the bargaining unit
who is not a member of the union, and such discrimination encourages union
membership; or, the union in its bargaining with the employer, discriminates
against a member of the bargaining unit because he is not a union member.
Such discrimination, though it happened to be based on racial considerations,
would be within the purview of the NLRB.
fair representation theory, indicated that "it commonly requires eighteen to twenty-five
months from the time charges are filed until an enforcement order is issued in the circuit
court of appeals." Keeney, Comments, in Symposium on Labor Relations Law 684, 685
(Slovenko ed. 1961).
48. NLRB Press Release No. 981, at 4, Sept. 14, 1964.

